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Abstract: This paper explores the transition from military to civil security in post-militancy and subsequent
militant operations in 2009 and the floods of 2010 in the Swat Valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan.
Based mainly on qualitative interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation with local
police and community women and men, the paper examines the shifting roles of the police over the
course of these crises and how community-police relations are continuously negotiated. Before the conflict,
relations between the community and police were weak, and traditional institutions such as the jirga were
functioning. Militants attacked both systems, targeting police, politicians, jirga leaders and education
institutions. Following the military operation, the responsibility for security became a confusing institutional
landscape of civil and military actors, which has reshaped community-police relations in Swat. Dichotomous
distinctions between state and non-state, formal and informal institutions fall short in describing the everyday
dynamic crafting of local institutions, particularly in a post-conflict context like Swat. New ‘hybrid’ institutions
have emerged, initiated by both government and communities, with varying degrees of success in building
trust and addressing peoples’ fears that militants may return. The results are relevant for both post-
conflict development assistance and police and justice reform not only in the study area, but also in other
post-conflict areas where states and communities find themselves re-negotiating their basic relationships.
Keywords: Community-oriented policing; crime prevention; democratization; Guatemala; participation;
police reform; post-conflict context
1. Introduction
As the world focused on geopolitics and events in
Afghanistan post-9/11, less visible but nevertheless signifi-
cant changes were taking place in northwestern Pakistan.
Cross-border movements that were historically common
in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Merged Districts (KPMD) [1]
began to increasingly influence adjoining areas in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) [2]. The Swat Valley is one of these
affected areas. From around 2006, militants [3] began to
move into the area, introducing a comparatively conserva-
tive religious agenda through local religious leaders such as
Sufi Mohammad and Fazal Ullah, and appealing to those
parts of the population who were already frustrated with an
ineffective government, a particularly slow and expensive
judicial process, and marked class differences [4]. Claim-
c© 2021 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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ing a moral high ground, as well as consensus of the local
population, the militants demanded quick justice systems
(Nizam-e-Adl) and Sharia [5] to be imposed in Swat, and
the government eventually conceded. The period between
2007-2009 was one of increasing violence in the valley,
where police, local leaders, moderate religious leaders, po-
litical figures and elite were targeted, and women’s mobility
was severely restricted. While some attempts were made
by both the government and local community leaders to
negotiate with the militants, the situation in Swat was con-
sidered so serious that the government undertook several
operations to rid the valley of militants. The decisive military
operation (Rah-e-Rast) took place in the late spring of 2009,
where approximately 2.5 million people from Swat were
displaced to camps and private homes in the Mardan and
Peshawar area while the army and militants fought for con-
trol of the valley. Within three months, Swat was ‘cleared’ of
militants, and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) began
their return to Swat.
The army took control [6], and was therefore able to
contribute to rescue, relief and reconstruction activities in
resettlements of IDPs in the aftermath of the devastating
floods of July 2010 as well. As the crisis normalized, the
army reduced its presence, and responsibility for general
security was gradually handed over to the civil police. There
have since been a number of donor initiatives to assist the
government in strengthening rule of law, including both the
police and the judiciary, which is seen as one important step
in preventing future conflicts in the area. The question re-
mains, however, whether these new initiatives are designed
with adequate attention to the local institutional, cultural
and political context, and local experiences of security and
insecurity.
This paper looks closely at how security and insecu-
rity in the area has been experienced and has led local
police and community members in terms of the creation
and evolution of civil and government institutions. It begins
by describing the situation in Swat in terms of civil secu-
rity before, during and after the conflict, with a focus on
the changing role of the police, the Army, traditional institu-
tions, judiciary, local administration, and police-community
relations. The paper goes on to discuss security and inse-
curities in the communities related to the conflict, including
the changing perceptions of the police and attempts to re-
form police and strengthen the rule of law in the area at
district and provincial levels. Finally, it looks at police re-
form processes in Swat in light of larger processes of police
and judiciary reform in Pakistan, including ideas around
policing and the judiciary in MDKP. The paper highlights
institutional bricolage as a best strategy in conflict and post-
conflict situations, particularly in traditional societies, for
better engagement of the local community and dispute res-
olution. It concludes with a discussion of what we can
learn from the Swat case in terms of understanding local
perspectives and institutions in finding innovative ways of
dealing with human security issues in post–conflict contexts.
The paper is based mainly on qualitative data collected
in Pakistan through individual interviews and focus group
discussions with national, provincial and district authorities,
development organizations, local and national police, and
community women and men in and from Swat between
2010-2019. In addition, policy documents and print media
sources have been consulted [7].
2. Conceptual framework
The study of civil security in relation to police-judiciary and
community relations in post-conflict contexts involves the
use of concepts that are often unclear and contested not
only in the literature, but in practice. There are three bodies
of theory that are central to the arguments presented in
this paper. The first is the literature dealing with security
and conflict. While conventional ideas of security in secu-
rity studies are concerned mainly with national security or
the security of the state [8–13], this research is grounded
in literature from critical security studies and development
studies where security is both broader and people-centered.
Furthermore, the focus is not merely on whether people
are secure or insecure, but on how security is constituted
in society [14–16]. Within this perspective, we find human
security useful as a concept. According to Alkierie [17], ‘the
objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of
all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that
is consistent with long-term human fulfillment’ [18]. This
expands ideas of insecurity beyond direct violence and war
to include the multiple sources and interrelatedness of inse-
curities faced by different women and men in post-conflict
contexts. Insecurity thus becomes a broad concept that en-
courages interdisciplinary thinking [19] about issues ranging
from food and livelihood insecurity to personal, health, envi-
ronmental and political insecurity. Along these lines, conflict
in this study takes on a broader meaning than merely war
and can range from armed conflict at a macro level to inter-
personal conflicts at a very micro level. This allows for an
analysis of conflict resolution and management at multiple
levels, and can include conflict over borders, resources, or
interpretations of cultural and religious norms and practices.
This is a particularly useful approach in Swat, as conflicts
are an integrated part of peoples’ everyday lives, are of-
ten multiple and overlapping, and include elements of both
political and personal interests at several levels [4,20–22].
The second body of literature central to this research
deals with policing, and more specifically community-
oriented policing (COP) and the Rule of Law (ROL). Most
countries in the world today subscribe to some form of
community-oriented policing in their work, comprising activi-
ties which are designed to bring the police in closer contact
with communities, in the belief that this will contribute to
more trusting relations and reduced crime [21]. These activ-
ities can take many forms, but are characteristically preven-
tative, proactive, problem-solving, and partnership-forming
[23]. Taking a critical view of COP, Brogden [24] describes
how the community-oriented policing agenda, which has its
roots primarily in Western ideas of law and justice, has be-
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come a central part of reform processes in developing and
transitional societies in the global South. He argues that de-
spite good intentions of addressing issues such as stability
and human rights, models of COP have been transferred
rather uncritically into these societies without adequately
considering local culture, norms or institutions, rendering
them seldom if ever appropriate. Brogden explains this as a
continuation of an earlier ‘law and development’ paradigm
from the 1960s and 70s that was based on ‘the general
assumption...that law was central to the development pro-
cess. Social change could not occur in a desired direction
without appropriate legal provisions’ [24]. This was under-
stood in terms of Western legal traditions and did not take
into account the vast differences in traditional laws, cus-
tomary codes, and local, indigenous, legal structures in
so-called developing countries. Since then, there has been
a growing understanding of legal pluralism and plural le-
gal orders [25–29], and the challenges and opportunities
this brings not only in the justice sector, but the policing
sector as well. In fact, development assistance projects
which focus on Rule of Law address the linkages between
these sectors, but usually with a focus on state institutions.
Golub [30] criticizes what he terms the ‘Rule of Law Or-
thodoxy’ so common in development assistance, which he
claims is top-down and confined to reform of the formal
justice sector, giving ‘insufficient attention to the needs of
the disadvantaged’. As an alternative, he introduces the
concept of Legal Empowerment, which more directly ad-
dresses the need to support civil society efforts to build the
legal capacities of the poor. In this approach: ‘(1) attorneys
support the poor as partners, instead of dominating them
as proprietors of expertise; (2) the disadvantaged play a
role in setting priorities, rather than government officials
and donor personnel dictating the agenda; (3) addressing
these priorities frequently involves non-judicial strategies
that transcend narrow notions of legal systems, justice sec-
tors, and institution building; (4) even more broadly, the use
of law is often just part of integrated strategies that include
other development activities’.
The concept of Legal Empowerment thus represents a
broadening of the approach to ROL to include local institu-
tions and local contexts of power relations. This resonates
well with Brogden’s [24] conclusions about how COP might
succeed if it abandons its top-down, fixed form and takes
note of local context: ‘...the key requirement must be that
the initiative is local in character. It must draw on local expe-
riences and practice in terms of what works...they must only
be implemented when they are constructed through the
benefit of local knowledge and sensitivity to local conditions
and legitimation’.
Despite his support of local perspectives, Brogden [24]
does recognize the challenges in bringing local institutions
into policing. Issues of accountability for local policing-like
groups and their lack of legal status, the politicization of
local groups and issues of impunity cause concern for re-
formers.
This leads us into the third body of literature, which
is related to the conceptualization of institutions and their
evolution. For this aspect we find discussions of resource
management institutions in the fields of anthropology, devel-
opment studies and political ecology particularly insightful
in understanding how local institutions are formed and re-
formed in the face of social, economic and political changes.
Contemporary understandings of resource management
institutions have been influenced by the rise of legal plural-
ism mentioned earlier, particularly in studies of customary
land rights. A plethora of studies of the complex user rights
regimes governing land, water, forest and mineral resources
have shown that local communities manage common re-
sources in ways that can only be understood through the
lens of the local social, economic and moral context in which
they are practiced. But while some scholars and policymak-
ers claim that these rules can translate into principles for
resource management which are universal and can be ap-
plied in the construction of new and sustainable institutions
[31], others disagree. Cleaver [32], a critical institutionalist,
argues that traditional institutions are rarely designed for
single purposes or address specific sectors exclusively—
they are more often multi-purpose and are an integral part
of social life such as wedding, funerals, savings groups, kin
or belief-based networks—important arenas ‘in which au-
thority is asserted or challenged, joint identities are formed
and consolidated, norms reproduced or negotiated’ [33]. It
is this embeddedness that contributes to the sustainability
of local institutions and makes the imposition of new institu-
tions by governments or the international community rarely
successful. In her work on water management in Zimbabwe,
Cleaver uses the concept of institutional bricolage to better
understand ‘the ways that interfaces between communities
and governments work’. Bricolage, according to Cleaver:
‘consists of the adaptive processes by which people imbue
configurations of rules, traditions, norms and relationships
with meaning and authority’ [32]. They are always evolving,
‘formed from and reproduced through the interactions of
daily life. This fact ensures both continuity and change in
institutional form [32].
While Cleaver focuses on resource management, her
analysis is just as relevant for all local institutions—and par-
ticularly interesting to use in the analysis of police, judiciary
and community interfaces. In our study of local institutions
such as the jirga in Swat, we find it useful to describe the
wider array of relationships in which the jirga engages, and
how as an institution it has been influenced by and adapted
to changes including extreme conflict, natural disasters, and
changing social norms of gender and social equity. This
also allows us to look more closely at how these local in-
stitutions interact with more formal government institutions,
including those that have emerged in connection with re-
form processes such as those discussed in this paper. in
particlular, it also allows us to distinguish between institu-
tions that are designed within the formal sector, those that
have evolved outside the formal sector, and those that we
here term as integrated or hybrid, that move somewhere
in the fuzzy areas between the formal and informal or in-
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digenous. Globally, there is an increasing trend towards
what is often referred to as alternative dispute resolution
processes of mediation and arbitration that is attached to
the formal justice system to, for example, reduce the burden
on the courts in corporate disputes [34] or in peace negotia-
tions, such as those undertaken by Nelson Mandela which
moved between formal and behind the scenes dialog and
communication [35]. There are also extensive examples of
indigenous conflict resolution institutions which have been
around for centuries, such as the Cantons of Guatemala
[36], which are richly described in the literature [37]. There
is less documentation, however, of processes of reform
which describe processes of bricolage which lead to the
development of institutions that lie somewhere in between
the formal and informal. This paper examines the case of
how police reform in KP, Pakistan moves precisely in this
fuzzy area and results in the formation of integrated or hy-
brid institutions which are legitimate in the eyes of both the
government and local communities.
3. Methodology
This research is based on a decade of field work in the
Swat Valley, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [38]. During this period
more than 10 villages were selected from upper, middle
and lower Swat including urban, rural, conflict-ridden and
flood-affected communities. The total number of respon-
dents is over 300, which has generated a comprehensive
set of data upon which this paper is grounded. Data was
collected using qualitative methods, including open-ended
and semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions
and participant observation. Interviews were the main tool
for collecting data from majority of the respondents, as
the information was often sensitive and required confiden-
tiality. Wherever it was appropriate and possible, FGDs
were used with both women and men in the selected areas.
Participant observation as tool was used during all inter-
views and FDGs, and when researchers were attending
and observing meetings and other gatherings. Purposive
sampling was used to select relevant respondents, villages,
government offices and civil society organizations. Socio-
economic, ethnic and gender diversity were considered
while selecting the respondents, with particular focus on
the representation of women (60), men (200), youth (40),
minorities (20), landowners (80), and the landless (120).
Other key informants interviewed included community lead-
ers (30), lawyers (15), teachers(20), health workers(16),
civil society organization staff (35), and government officials
(40) including police and other security officers at local (20),
district (10), provicial (7) and national (3) levels. Particularly
central to this paper is the data from respondents who were
either members of jirga (12) or village committees (30), or
were affected by conflict (250), militancy and police and
who approached jirga (45), Dispute Resolution Councils
(DRCs) (12), village committees or police as a party to
disputes or conflict [39]. A detailed question guide was
developed for each group of respondents to explore, for ex-
ample, how different actors perceive formal (police, courts)
and informal institutions for dispute resolution and justice,
how they experience security and insecurity, how they view
community-police relations in terms of trust-building and ac-
countability, and how they view recent police reforms such
as the new KP Police Act of 2017 and the establishment of
DRCs. Both authors conducted the fieldwork. Questions
guides were developed in English but whenever needed it
was communicated to respondents in Urdu and Pashto with
the help of the second author and other research staff. All
the data was organized and coded and analyzed according
to key themes in the question guide and those that emerged
in the interviews.
4. Civil Society and Government Security and
Conflict Resolution Institutions
Despite a focus on both civil security and conflict resolu-
tion in post-conflict contexts, conventional reform processes
tend to see these roles as rather separate, with different
institutions (such as the police, the courts) dealing with se-
curity and conflict resolution respectively, often in spite of
informal institutions. In contexts where institutional brico-
lage is at work, however, we can see how these functions
can be closely linked, and performed either within the same
institution, or by several different institutions in collabora-
tion, depending on the context and the type of conflict. This
section looks more closely at how government and local
institutions in Swat have been involved with security and
dispute resolution, and how both formal and informal insti-
tutions evolved through a process of institutional bricolage
to meet the demand of the new security situation in conflict
and post conflict Swat.
4.1. The Jirga System
In the period stretching from the incorporation of the
Swat Valley into Pakistan proper in 1969 to the conflict
in 2008/2009, people had two options in trying to resolve
their differences. The first was to continue to rely on their
traditional, centuries-old system of the jirga, a Pakhthun
institution where community members call together a group
of elders and/or competent and trusted villagers to mitigate
a conflict [40]. Even during the pre-1969 rule of the Wali
of Swat, the jirga was the main institution to which com-
munity members would bring their conflicts for deliberation,
confident that a decision would be made in a swift and
fair manner. The Wali of Swat, as the ruler, would nomi-
nate members of the jirga. In that system, the jirga was a
fixed body, as it was and still is in much of KPMD. Today,
however, the composition of most of the jirga in Swat is
not fixed. The aggrieved groups or parties choose elders
who, in consultation with the aggrieved parties, finalize the
membership and scope of a jirga. All villagers have some
form of access to this institution, and although women are
almost never included in a jirga, they can often access
this decision-making group through their male relatives, or
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through influential women in the community who could bring
their cases forward for them indirectly. In one of the study vil-
lages in upper Swat, for example, certain influential women
were available on specific days of the week for consultation
by women experiencing conflict or other difficulties. These
women would either handle the complaints through negotia-
tions by themselves or approach the community elders to
bring the case before the jirga. Nevertheless, a Woman’s
Jirga was established in Swat in 2013 to improve women’s
access to justice [41]. Despite being a traditional institu-
tion, the jirga is a reflection of the local power dynamics
in each community, and its character can therefore differ
significantly depending on the village, and over time [42].
In the case study below, we describe the workings of one
of the jirga in our study to help to illustrate the dynamic
nature of these institutions in Swat and their role in conflict
resolution and civil security.
4.2. Case Study of a Local Jirga (KP)
Kanju is a village not far from the district center of Swat,
an area that was highly affected by the conflict. Prior to
1979, there was likely nothing particular about this Jirga,
and it worked as many others, calling people together to
handle disputes within the community. In 1979, however,
the jirga was registered as a Social Welfare Society. This
was the first such organization in Swat, which now number
over 200. After some years it expanded its activities with
the establishment of a women’s wing which provided social
support, charity and education to poor illiterate women and
girls. In 2013 it also established a youth wing, which was
mainly for boys, whose purpose is to contribute to the well-
being of all in the community, mainly through first aid and
firefighting. Thus, through the years, the jirga has expanded
its mandate from one of conflict resolution, to one of social
welfare, with the work done on a voluntary basis by those
women, men and youth who are able to contribute. One
young teacher, for example, taught at the primary school
during the day, and gave lessons most evenings to poorer
women at her home.
Despite this branching out into social welfare, the jirga it-
self continues to be the main body for hearing cases brought
up by community women and men. The leader of the jirga
explains its workings [43]:
‘The jirga meets every Friday from noon until the evening,
depending on how many cases are brought to us. The par-
ties referred by the court also attend this jirga—the jirga
issues a summons to them. When there is any dispute,
the local police refer them to this committee and say that if
the committee is unable to solve your problem, only then
come to us. The police and government officials also came
to know about this arrangement, and they referred female
related cases, enmity cases and murder cases etc. to solve
them here. The jirga reasons openly and people compro-
mise. There is 99% success rate of this jirga. The commu-
nity really listens and agrees to what the jirga decides and
problems get solved. The religious scholars also attend this
jirga and they try to decide things in light of Islamic rules.
In case the parties don’t accept the decision of the jirga,
the jirga cannot impose decisions on them and sends them
back to the local court. The comments and reasoning of
jirga is also sent to the court in case of failure to reach an
agreement. The local court also calls the witnesses from
the jirga. 10–12 persons always sit in jirga who are deputed
purely for this purpose. These persons are elected after
every 2 years. There are 150 male members in the com-
munity. They have right to vote and they vote after every 2
years.’
All of the cases are meticulously registered in writing by
the jirga, and they invite legal advisors to attend when they
are needed. They have four legal advisors in their member-
ship, and contact with two of the best known women legal
advisors in the district, who mainly hear cases of gender-
based violence. Since men cannot meet with women openly,
the women members sit with the women complainants and
there is a purdah (dividing curtain) between the male and
female’s side. A woman, if she wishes, can authorize a
male representative (father, brother, husband) to come on
her behalf. Since 1979 the jirga has heard over 4000 cases,
which range from family disputes over inheritance, dowry,
divorce, child custody, domestic violence, land rights, and
murder. The leader of the jirga explains that even in very
difficult cases such as murder, they manage to come to a
compromise:
‘There is a cultural norm called Gheirat which is a fight
for their dignity. People can go to any extreme level to take
revenge. If something is paid by the murderer’s family, there
is a compromise between the parties. We even call the
police and government and we explain things to them after
the decision has been made. The enemies are invited to
take an oath of peace and hug each other. The final cere-
monies are usually held in the mosque. They then commit
that from now on they will use pens instead of guns. In
cases of murder, the compromise is difficult and usually
takes long. There is always some compensation made by
the murderer’s family. In rare cases, the parties accept
decisions without any compensation. In certain cases, the
murderer’s family even migrates to other areas. The local
community is well aware of the way the processes and de-
cisions are made by this jirga. Therefore, they always come
with confidence for their cases.’
The decisions of the jirga are always based on compro-
mise. According to the leader of the jirga, the success of
the jirga is well-known in the area, and even people who
had their cases heard in the government refer their cases
to this jirga. These forums put a high value on restorative
justice, with one of their main objectives being to restore
peace in the community.
The institution of jirga is also used when conflicts
emerge at higher levels. When the Taliban gained power
in Swat during 2008/2009, their reign became one of ex-
treme violence. Target killings, kidnappings, extortion, be-
headings, and rape were reported as common in many
areas. Even many who originally supported the Taliban
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as a source of swift justice and were rewarded with land
taken from their landlords, came to fear them. As the crisis
in Swat worsened in late 2008, the Qowmi Awami Jirgah
(National Peace Restoration Committee) tried to end the
violence. This jirga included members from all of Swat,
including religious scholars, representatives of government
bodies (Union Council secretaries and former Nazim [38]),
community notables, the police (passive members), as well
as two members of the Taliban. The leader of the Kanju
jirga was also a member in this committee. The decisions
of this committee are highly honored, and it is in fact still
functioning and interacts with the army. In early 2009, 50
members from Qowmi Awami Jirgah went to Fazal Ullah
and the army generals for discussions and made them meet
in the provincial government guest house. As a result of the
series of discussions, the Taliban were about to leave the
occupied places without fighting, until the religious leader
Fazal Ullah addressed the community, reversing this reso-
lution. Although he had agreed on the compromise points
in the jirga, when he came on stage, he said something
else, akin to ‘I was fighting for Islam and I don’t accept the
government bodies’, undermining the careful deliberations
of the traditional jirga. His speech was transmitted through
the media. That address was in early 2009, and not long
afterwards, the military operation was undertaken.
4.3. The Police and Court System
The second option for people in conflict was to bring a case
through the police to the formal justice system. Before the
merger with Pakistan, in addition to the traditional jirga sys-
tem, the Wali of Swat had his own court system, headed
by a chief justice appointed by him. This was replaced with
a formal police and judicial system in the 1969 merger. In
order to register a conflict, one now had to go to the police
station in person, file a First Incident Report (FIR), and ap-
pear before the court for a decision. From its onset in 1969,
this formal system was slow, expensive, and only accessible
to those with sufficient resources to engage a lawyer. This
resulted in cases remaining unsolved for 10, 20 or even 30
years. This is also the case elsewhere in Pakistan. In fact,
the police in Pakistan is historically considered as one of the
most ill-equipped, poorly trained, highly politicized, corrupt
and poorly managed government institution [21]. They are
constantly criticized throughout the country, including the
Police in KP, for their poor services. This lack of a function-
ing formal police and justice system and the frustration it
incited amongst the populace has been cited as one of the
main reasons that the Taliban, who promised quick justice,
was able to gain popular support in the Swat Valley [22,44].
This was compounded by significant class differences, par-
ticularly in lower Swat, where large landowners controlled
production and trade, and were over-represented in village
leadership. These class differences were also capitalized
on by the Taliban, who incited poor tenants to revolt against
their landlords. The government was seen as an agent of
the rich, and the police and court in particular were seen as
protectors of the influential landlords.
According to community members, the police in partic-
ular had a poor reputation before the conflict. They were
considered to be ineffective, corrupt, violent, unresponsive,
and in fact a source of insecurity for most of the popu-
lation. They were also not accessible to women—it was
considered both shameful and risky for a woman to go to
a police station. As government representatives, however,
they became targets themselves as the militants infiltrated
Swat. Prior to the decisive operation by the military in May
2009, the police in Swat had been the target of increasing
violence from militants, with direct attacks on check posts
and police stations. Police suffered significant losses of
life, and many officers deserted their posts in areas where
the militants took control. Militants were well-armed, and
easily confiscated vehicles and supplies from communities
and government staff. The police who remained at their
posts found it difficult to secure the area due to insufficient
staff and equipment and responded by pulling back from
the public scene and fortifying their police stations to pro-
tect themselves. This mistreatment and target killing at
the hand of militants, however, also made police “affectees”
and hence got the sympathy of the public. In addition, the
majority of the middle and lower rank police officials were
usually locals and the community felt their suffering.
In the first six months following the decisive operation,
the army was in full control of the area, operating all check-
points and conducting house-to-house searches for mili-
tants. In this early phase, the police served together with
the army at army check points, mainly for training. Almost
immediately after the operation, the government initiated an
aggressive recruitment campaign for new police officers, re-
cruiting actively from the IDP camps those who had suffered
most under the militants, and would likely be motivated to
help secure the area [45].
When the flood hit in July 2010, the army and the police
were both active in rescue activities. Gradually, as the situ-
ation following the flood stabilized, the police were handed
over control of checkpoints, and as their numbers increased
over the next two years, they became more visible than
the army in the streets. In general, community women and
men have seen an improvement in the functioning of the
police following the conflict and flood, which they feel is
due to police training by the army. The police themselves,
while perhaps more disciplined in relation to communities
as a result of working with the army, see their own role as
much broader than earlier, far beyond a strict law and order
focus. As one police official from Swat stated: ‘The role of
police is to supervise law and order at every level. In each
and every sector, the police is involved. Police are even
involved in small events and emergencies like rehabilitation,
distribution of aid, when different buildings are on fire, flood
etc.’ The police, however, continue to struggle with limited
resources and low morale. The police leadership at that
time and even today is trying to maintain motivation in an
area where they have faced deadly threats and attacks in
the past. The army is still in the Swat valley, but its activities
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are concentrated on performing limited operations in the
more remote areas to keep militants out of the valley.
As the police force was being reconstituted and ex-
panded, they introduced a system of community police.
While militancy was at its peak, the government of KP tem-
porarily recruited around 8,000 male volunteers to support
the demoralized police in Swat. This volunteer force was
called community police. The community police would sup-
port the normal police at checkpoints and in providing se-
curity to potential target individuals and institutions of the
militants. Community police in Swat were mostly young
people who received training to support police in fighting
militancy and maintaining law and order situations. Quite
recently, the government of KP made the community police
volunteers permanent employees of the Swat police.
The situation in Swat has thus been one of shifting re-
lations of power, authority and trust between the army, the
police and community members (see Table 1). These rela-
tions, however, do not shift evenly or coherently throughout
Swat. Although higher political interests are clearly at work
in determining parts of these relationships, such as the
establishment of an army Brigade or the level of resources
provided to the police, these relations are as well-negotiated
through everyday experiences of army, police and commu-
nity members in the course of interactions. This means that
power relations will be different in areas where insurgents
regularly strike than they are in areas of relative peace,
such that people’s ideas about security, crime and the gov-
ernment in general can differ significantly. This begs for
approaches to police reform that operate in different micro-
environments within a larger political and cultural context.
Table 1. Civil Society and Government Security and Conflict Resolution Institutions in KP.
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5. Changing Insecurities in Swat
As mentioned above, there has been a gradual transition
from military to civil security in the years following the mil-
itary operation in Swat. Evidence of this shift includes in-
creases in the numbers of police and police stations, reduc-
tion of military check posts on the roads and replacement
of military with police at the remaining check posts. The
army is still in Swat but mostly stay in their barracks, except
for assisting at a few checkpoints together with police. How-
ever, the army still shows its presence in convoys during
any time of day and night as well as targeted operations
on intelligence information. Most of the operations are now
jointly conducted by the police and army. The presence of
the army and strong intelligence network of both police and
army make the re-entry of militants into Swat difficult.
In general, when reflecting on this changing context,
both women and men stated that the security situation went
from good to very bad, and then again to better: ‘Our mobil-
ity was really easy before the militancy but during militancy
we were confined inside our homes in fear. Now things are
little bit better, but I still feel fear in going out but despite fear
I have to go out to take care of different things since I am
the head of the house.’ (Widow, female household head).
Most respondents also explained that crime in the vil-
lage was almost non-existent before the conflict. During the
conflict, however, there was stealing, looting, robberies, kid-
napping and murder. With the army and the police in place,
the situation has again improved, with the exception of the
drug trade. The crime rate related to drugs sale was said
to be increasing in the villages, and many feel that there
has been no action taken by the police or any committee
or Jirga against it. One female key informant stated, for
example, that the poorer class people who were involved in
drugs sale, are now very well off. They also say that there
are still militants in the village.
According to a police official in Swat, the overall rate of
crime has decreased after the conflict. He referred to two
types of crimes:
‘In our point of view, one type of crime is the use of drugs
like opium, churs etc. and smuggling of weapons. When
the rate of such crime increases, it is a kind of positive sign
for us. This is positive in the sense that these crimes are
not that dangerous - unlike the substantive crimes. The
second type of crime is murder cases, robbery, car snatch-
ing etc.- also called substantive crimes. When the rate of
substantive crimes increases, it is bad and a negative sign
for us. Now these substantive crimes are less than before
while Swat was on top in these crimes before the crisis’.
This indicates that views on crime and experiences of
insecurity may not be related in the way one might think.
While the police view substantive crime as high before the
conflict, and better now, communities can talk of low inse-
curity before the conflict and a higher degree of uncertainty
now. The relationship between crime and insecurity in Swat
is complex, and experienced quite differently depending on
one’s gender, social status, and whether they are part of
the police or military.
The communities often have mixed feelings about the
role of the military, particularly in the period immediately
following the conflict. Despite their role in ridding the area
of the militants, and the positive role that they played in as-
sisting after the flood, the army is considered powerful and
is looked upon with trepidation. Community members feel
that members of the army often overstep their boundaries
in terms of how they perform their duties:
‘The police used to address crimes before the conflict,
but now everything is under the control of army. During the
conflict even police were afraid, and they could not do any-
thing as they themselves were slaughtered by the militants
and many policemen even left their jobs in fear. Though the
army has done well to us it also has done bad too. They
helped us in getting rid of militants but killed many innocent
people and without any proof arrested many people. They
have usurped properties of innocent people. They have
broken their trust. Now we don’t trust anybody’ (Female key
informant).
Community members are reluctant to criticize the army,
but express frustration in the degree to which villagers were
forced to take part in the defense committees, and how the
army had involved themselves in conflict resolution. Par-
ticularly in the period immediately following the conflict, all
complaints and village conflicts were decided by the army,
rather than the local jirga. As one elder villager put it, ‘the
army can make decisions as they like, but the conflicts do
not disappear, and as soon as the army leaves, they will
again surface, we are just waiting’. There were also many
conflicts that were not addressed due to the heavy pres-
ence of the army—aggrieved parties preferred to wait until
a more opportune time when the army was gone.
As community women and men emerged from the con-
flict to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, they faced many
additional challenges. The mega flood of 2010 destroyed
crops and infrastructure at a time when people still hadn’t
recovered from the conflict, setting recovery back an esti-
mated 10 years. They were faced with multiple insecurities—
not only personal or political insecurity, but food, livelihood,
health and environmental insecurities, which required assis-
tance from the government and the international community
far beyond what a conventional army or police could provide.
Despite the government operations, communities lacked
trust in the government. There was also a high degree of
mistrust within communities, as people could be reported
to the authorities for having supported the militants, when
they may in fact only been in personal conflict with their
accuser. The influence of local jirga and moderate religious
scholars had already been weakened during the conflict as
conservative religious leaders were given relatively more
power by the militants [46]. When the army took control
after the conflict, they constituted defense committees who
reported directly to the army, and later to the police. As
these were not answerable to the village leadership, the
power of the local jirga again weakened.
Despite this shift in power relations away from local in-
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stitutions, as the situation stabilized, the army left many
of the villages, and these defense committees began to
disappear. The government, police, judiciary and communi-
ties began to renegotiate their relationships to ensure that
conflict would not return to the region. Jirga leaders, such
as those in Kanju, reconnected directly with the govern-
ment through the re-establishment of relations between the
jirga, police and courts. The jirga once again became an
important local institution, and one which the government
acknowledged as a potential partner in keeping peace in
the area.
Historically, the KP Police worked under the Police Act
1861 and KP police rules of 1975. Formal courts decide
criminal, civil, rights-based and other cases under the do-
main of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, which comprises
elaborate provisions on the composition, jurisdiction, pow-
ers and functions of the Court. Formal police and court
institutions, however, were neither designed nor able to
address broader but nevertheless highly relevant diverse
needs of the community in a post (or ongoing)-conflict situa-
tion, which involve many different and more complex issues
than merely insurgencies. Government policy reflected a
renewed interest in finding innovative ways of addressing
these challenges, and better ways for the police to link
with communities, particularly in conflict situations. New
initiatives from the government emerged after the conflict,
supported by new policy, such as the Strategic Framework
for KP police (2014), and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police
Act of 2017, where, for example, community policing is
highlighted [21]. This was complemented by efforts in civil
society to promote better relations between the police and
community. Linking institutions vastly different in charac-
ter, however, is not an easy task, especially in post-conflict
Swat where trust is in deficit. While some institutions are
designed for specific purposes of addressing certain kinds
of crime or conflict, others may be more diffuse in their pur-
pose, but at the same time more dynamic and potentially
more sustainable. In Pakistan, constructing new institutions
with the right mix of function and membership to be effective,
preventative and sustainable has proven a challenge. The
next section will present and discuss some of the newer
initiatives by the KP government and civil society intended
to improve relations between the police and communities,
manage conflict and promote peace.
6. Designing Institutions and Institutional Bricolage
at the State-community Apex
Formal judiciaries and alternate dispute resolutions insti-
tutions are constantly debated in Pakistan. The formal
judicial system is weak, expensive, complicated, and time-
consuming, and decisions often do not remove the enmity
of the parties. Informal institutions such as the jirga thus
remain relevant and accessible for local women and men,
and as described above, maneuver somewhere in between
where the state ends and local communities begin. As a
local institution which deals with, among other things, con-
flict resolution, its functions often overlap with those of the
formal justice system. It hears cases between parties and
hands down judgments, but also refers some cases to the
courts and vice versa, as discussed in the above mentioned
case study. As a local institution it is both appreciated for
its authority in achieving restorative justice and preventing
the escalation of conflict between adversaries, but is also
criticized for its exclusively male elitist composition and a
lack of accountability to social and gender equity and hu-
man rights. This has led to heated debates on whether jirga
should be formalized and transformed to ensure oversight
by the government, acknowledged in their own right as in-
formal institutions with formal authority, or left as they are
[47,48]. And while the jirga is the community level institution
with which government departments such as the judiciary,
police and line ministries as well as development organi-
zations take contact to discuss collaboration, they are only
one aspect of a civil society with which government can
collaborate [49,50]. The ways in which this collaboration
is envisioned will partly reflect how one understands and
interacts with local institutions. Recognizing the important
role of local institutions in dispute resolution and public ac-
ceptability of its decisions, the KP government (including,
police, army and courts) has established a number of bod-
ies which are in some ways hybrid institutions, but in others
new constellations integrating formal and informal aspects
in innovative ways. This section looks at the design and
evolution of several of these institutions in terms of their role
in ROL and dispute resolution (see Table 2).
6.1. Islahi/Musalihati Committees
The Local Government Ordinance 2001 promulgated by
the military government advocated for the establishment
of Musalihati Anjuman (reconciliation associations). The
establishment of these associations, however, was con-
sidered politically motivated, so they were not accepted
as legitimate by provincial law and the police department,
and after some time were abandoned altogether. The po-
lice then introduced Islahi/Musalihati Committees (Righ-
teous/Reconciliation Committees) in the province in 2006
as a new system of dispute resolution. These committees
represented a bricolage of government and local institutions,
where the police and community elders from traditional jirga
or other notables in local communities engaged together to
strengthen the justice system at the local level [51], under
government supervision. This experiment was initiated in
Hazara Division of KP province where the Islahi/Musalihati
Committee was put in place at police station level through
Standing Orders of Inspector General of Police KP and later
extended to other districts of the province [52]. These com-
mittees helped to reduce the burden on police and courts
by resolving disputes in a quick and transparent way, and
according to local culture and traditions. These continued
to be established in the period following the conflict in Swat,
when the government, police and communities were in di-
alog to try to improve relations which were suffering from
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a lack of trust. As one of the main complaints against the
government prior to and during the conflict was the lack of
quick justice, focus was put on trying to find better ways
to involve the communities in conflict resolution that would
reduce the number of FIRs and court cases brought to an
already overloaded justice sector. Under this system, the
designated community elders would meet once a week with
the police to go through cases brought either before the
jirga or before the police, to discuss what should be han-
dled in the Islahi/Musalihati committee, and what should be
referred to the police. Both the jirga and police preferred
settlement by this new committee or jirga—but if a case
could not be solved locally it would be registered at the
police station. This arrangement, however, was criticized
mainly by lawyers, who were in effect left out of the process,
as well as community members who did not agree with how
the members of the committee were chosen. The lawyers
eventually filed a case with the Supreme Court against this
arrangement, who deemed it to be unconstitutional. It is
worth mentioning that consecutive governments hardly tried
to bring reforms in the judicial system or in the police depart-
ment. There was a lack of political will and an unduly strong
bureaucracy that did not want a quick justice system and
autonomous and strong police department as demanded by
the majority of the local community and other key respon-
dents. The Islahi/Musalihati Committee gave new hope
to communities for solving local disputes without wasting
time and money in the police and court system. After some
time, however, these committees became controversial and
politicized. In addition to criticism from lawyers, they faced
resistance from the courts as well. Also, the police held a
dominant role in the Islahi/Musalihati committees, and local
communities still would not fully trust them.
6.2. Defense Committees
The army established a system of defense committees in
each village to report any suspicious activities or people
entering the area. These committees were said to be volun-
tary (they were indeed not paid), and all of the households
were expected to take part through the participation of a
male member in the committee. Participation was in fact
required, and those who missed their duty would have to
pay a fine. The defense committees reported directly to the
army and were composed of local civilians at community
level who patrolled their own people during night against
militants, criminals and insurgents. The committees were
headed by local men trusted by the army. Armed forces
selected the members of defense committees and gave
them the task of sharing information with law enforcement
agencies regarding militants and helping the army in guard-
ing their areas in times of need [53]. The members of the
defense committee would inform law enforcement agencies
right away if they sensed any dubious activity or observed
any suspicious person in their area. In this way they were
helping security forces to ‘prevail peace in the region’ [54].
Defense committees were organized at UC and village-level
in the entire Swat Valley with the army’s assistance and sup-
port. Initially there were a total of 65 defense committees
in 65 union councils in Swat with each comprising 30 to 60
members from each village across the region. Local people
were cautious in their interaction with defense committee
members, as they saw them as spies for the army. It is
also worth mentioning, however, that members of defense
committees were frequently targeted by unknown attackers,
and many were killed during and after the crises. Most of
the defense committees have now been dissolved due to
the restoration of peace in Swat.
While defense committees were not very popular in
the eyes of the community due to forced volunteerism and
target killings, people nevertheless saw value in building
relations with the police and the army. At some point, the po-
lice took over the checkpoints and began to handle routine
crime cases in the area. Contrary to the more indepen-
dent jirga, both Islahi/Muslihati committees and defense
committees were controlled by police and army, and de-
pendent on them for security issues and developmental
interventions. While defense committees were formed to
keep an eye on militants during and soon after the military
operation, local communities consider defense committees
very risky. In fact, the majority of the defense committee
members were targeted and killed. Therefore, while it might
be have been a useful strategy for the military to use local
people to protect themselves from militants through defense
committees, these committees contributed very little to the
overall peace and security of Swat. The strategy was one-
sided i.e. military forces forced ‘volunteerism’, where the
defense committee would fully follow the instructions from
Army rather than local practice and wisdom. Based on
this, defense committees cannot be considered bricolage
institutions. Rather, they represent a step in a process of
institutional bricolage where military forces engaged local
community in different ways as partners in contributing to
security. Eventually this would evolve into other forms of
institutional cooperation.
6.3. UNDP Islahi Committees
In Pakistan, there are two main camps of opinion around
the issues of jirga. One camp favors the formalization the
jirga, making them a recognized body by the state. This ap-
proach has a strong following in the former tribal areas (now
KPMD), where the state has had relatively little influence
in society, and the jirga are often fixed entities. The other
camp opposed the formalization of jirga, citing the lack of
women’s and minorities representation in the jirga, and the
lack of focus on the protection of human rights. However, in
the aftermath of the conflict, the international Rule of Law
activities in Swat and KP also began to address people’s
access to civil security and the formal judicial system in
increasingly innovative ways. In 2011, the province initiated
a Strengthening the Rule of Law (ROL) project in collabora-
tion with the United Nation Development Program (UNDP),
and in 2012 they initiated the Strengthening of the Rule of
143
Law in Malakand Division, which included the Swat Valley.
While conventional approaches to rule of law focused on
improving access of local women and men to the formal
justice system, the programs in Malakand explored ways
to link more positively with existing local institutions such
as the jirga and create new hybrid-like institutions (simi-
lar to the Musalihati Committees) which could have more
credibility and accountability to local community members.
An alternative discourse has revolved around the creation
of new institutions based on some of the core principles
of the jirga, but with a strong link to civil law and formal
institutions. It is along these lines that the ROL projects
were maneuvering. The KP Comprehensive Development
Strategy document refers to Musalihati Anjuman, commit-
tees that were formed jointly by UNDP and the Ministry of
Local Government Rural Development. Their purpose was
to reduce conflicts at the grassroots level, thus reducing the
overall burden on formal policing and justice system.
In 2012, the Kanju jirga of Swat was approached by
UNDP to discuss the formation of such a Musalihati Anju-
man. After agreement was reached on its formation, the
leader of the Kanju jirga became its convener. The mem-
bers included the police, judiciary and the community, as
well as representatives from the political parties. A meeting
was held at the district level every Sunday. At this meeting
they discussed each case, reporting on which cases have
been solved in the jirga, which cases have been referred
to the courts, and which new cases will be referred to the
jirga. The leader of the jirga was in fact not happy with
this committee, as it was, in his opinion, too politicized. He
was constantly being approached by the political members
who would sought to influence his discussions for their own
or their constituent’s gain. Under such arrangements the
police end up taking a back seat, reducing rather than im-
proving their direct interaction with the jirga. The police
were also subject to political control under this arrangement,
something that was already considered to be one of the
most serious weaknesses in the Pakistani police at that
time. The UNDP Islahi committee were not really accepted
by local community, police and courts. From community
and other stakeholders point of views this initiative was
rather imposed by the donor without any consensus. How-
ever, there were some financial and other incentives for
committee members and so they continued work in those
committee until they became inactive.
6.4. Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs)
The government of KP the under the Police Act 2017 took an
important initiative of engaging local community in decision-
making by formally introducing Dispute Resolution Councils
(DRCs) across the province, which had initially started in
2014. Organized at district level, in a DRC the victim, the
offender and local community elders pursue reconciliation
through arbitration, forgiveness and compromise accept-
able to all stakeholders [21]. The DRC is comprised of 21
members including retired civil officers, lawyers, education-
ists and other notable individuals from the community. Most
of the committee members are men, making the represen-
tation of women quite limited. The concerned parties must
agree to approach DRCs instead of reporting the case in
the police station and ending in court. The members of
the DRC are divided into three-member juries who hear
different cases on different days in the DRCs designated
office. Every member is bound to be a part of a jury. DRCs
are quick in decision-making compared to courts where
cases remain pending for years and even decades [21].
Parties most often accept the decision of the DRC and the
issue is resolved. Quick decisions and dispute resolution
are the hallmark of DRC, however, it does not necessarily
ensure justice to the aggrieved party. DRC can also provide
opportunities for powerful parties to exercise their bargain-
ing power and escape harsh punishment that they might
have received from police and courts. Women also bring
their cases to DRCs, despite the lack of female members.
However, the turnout of cases and acceptance of decisions
by the parties clearly indicate that the DRCs have gained
the trust of both community and police.
While the DRCs are only in KP for the moment, their
work is appreciated by local governments, police depart-
ments, local communities and even judiciaries in other
provinces where jirga are not a part of the cultural land-
scape. It has been used, for example, as a model by the
Chief Justice Lahore High Court in the launching and es-
tablishment of Alternate Dispute Resolution Centers (ADR)
in all districts of Punjab in 2017. All cases referred to the
ADRs and their status are compiled and released on the
website of the Lahore High Court. The nature of registered
cases/disputes are categorized into criminal, civil, family,
guardian, rent, cases against services providers such as
WAPDA, SNGPL, PTCL and WASA. Most of the cases are
mediated by the civil judge in each district. The success
rate of ADRs is around 45-50% with more than one hun-
dred thousand cases reported and handled by mid-2019
[55]. In case of ADRs, the Court categorically encourages
community to go to ADR instead of court, as can be seen
by the slogan ‘Litigation leads to fears and mediation leads
to cheers!’ on a banner on display in the ADR. While the
ADRs represent an important move, they work under the
Lahore High Court, while the DRCs are run jointly by police
and community elders.
6.5. Public Liaison Councils (PLC)
In a push for better public and police interaction, the KP Po-
lice Act 2017 demanded the establishment of Public Liaison
Councils (PLC) at village and neighborhood levels where
70% of the council members should be elected community
representative and the remaining 30% be elders and per-
sons of repute. The PLC is headed by a designated police
officer and members are selected for two years. The KP
Act 2017 clearly defined the role and responsibilities of the
PLC, but here we can summarize that the PLC is expected
to notice unusual and unwanted activities in their areas,
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and keep close liaison with the police to maintain law and
order situation. The PLC also informs police about any new
development, tensions, arrival of new people or tenants and
violation of rules if any in the area. While these councils
clearly hold the role of being informants for the police, in
areas where civil society organizations have been engaged,
these councils often become the focus of community-based
policing activities that work towards trust-building and crime
prevention, and include both male and female youth in their
membership. They therefore have the potential to contribute
to the development of new, more trusting relations between
the police and the communities.
6.6. Public Safety Commissions (PSC)
The KP Act 2017 required establishment of provincial- and
district-level public safety commissions. The commission’s
selections, functions and roles are clearly defined in the
Act. Members of the commission include elected represen-
tatives from ruling and oppositions parties, retired civil and
security officers, and representatives of civil society includ-
ing female and minority. The major role of the commission
is to oversee the performance of police in maintaining law
and order in the province and to develop trust between
police and the public.
Table 2. Integrated (‘hybrid’) Government and Civil Society Institutions.
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We can see from the evolution of the initiatives pre-
sented in this section that the formal institutions of the gov-
ernment (police, army and court) realized the importance of
community-based mechanisms of dialogue and negotiation
both to better understand the position of the conflicting par-
ties and to resolve them through mediation. This became
particularly important in KP and Swat during and following
the conflict, when there was a need for mechanisms which
built trust both within communities, and between the com-
munities and the government. By exploring new avenues
of collaboration between the police, courts and communi-
ties, the government demonstrated that they were willing
to address the demands of communities for more fairness
in the justice system. Through trial and error, and close
collaboration between the government and communities,
initiatives bricolaged into institutions that combined locally-
grounded principles of mediation, compromise, forgiveness
and reconciliation with law and order and legal justice. On
the one hand, this means that rival parties might not get
complete justice and they might not fully satisfy the rights of
each party. On the other hand, the parties are encouraged
to compromise, embrace and forgive each other without
spending often exorbitant amounts of money and time in
the formal security and justice system.
As seen here, the evolution of these institutions still has
a long way to go in order to incorporate the interests and par-
ticipation of women and minorities—they need to be more
inclusive and sensitive to power relations to obtain wider
recognition. Nevertheless, they revolve around local issues
which are of immediate concern to communities and that
are not taken care by any other forum or institution. They
are often multi-purpose, and their character can change
over time to accommodate changing contexts. They can
address issues that are beyond the scope of village jirga
and are able to consult legal principles that were previously
not accessible to village jirga. By operating on a higher
level than village jirga, however, they are less accessible
for some. For policing, and specifically community-based
policing, it is important that police reach beyond the up-
per level conflict resolution institutions and participate at
the community level in terms of building trust. Thus, the
PLCs become an important institution to focus on in terms
of reform and competence building in communication and
mediation.
7. Conclusions
The evolution of security and justice institutions in Swat and
KP has not occurred in a bubble. National and international
politics, history and reform processes have influenced the
ways in which government and community relations are
evolving. The historical and contemporary geo-politics of
the region, continuous shifts between civil and military gov-
ernments, and the colonial basis of the police and judicial
system have contributed both to Pakistan’s focus on state
security, and to weakened civil institutions. Government
and community relations in Swat have undergone signifi-
cant changes since its incorporation into KP in 1969. Since
incorporation, communities in Swat have berated the Pak-
istan government for its weak institutions and inability to
address their broader set of insecurities. Rather than en-
gage with poorly trained and violent police, and expensive
and slow court processes, communities have preferred to
avoid government institutions altogether and instead rely
on local institutions such as the jirga to address their needs.
This dissatisfaction with government services was one im-
portant factor in the complexity of the conflict in the late
2000s.
The serious toll the conflict took on communities
and government institutions, and particularly the police,
prompted the government and civil society to explore,
together, alternative ways to interact to promote peace
and trust-building. The institutions that have evolved
since the conflict represent a move away from single-
purpose, formal, rule of law institutions toward a legal
empowerment approach, where communities participate
in defining the tenets of their own security issues. This
has opened for multipurpose, dynamic and integrated
institutions, that are legitimate in the eyes of the police,
justice system and communities. It also supports a move
towards community-oriented policing by institutionalizing
joint problem identification and preventative activities in
Public Liaison Councils (PLCs).
The integrated or ‘hybrid’ institutions that have evolved
from this complex set of influences are not without prob-
lems of power and inclusion, and they may sometimes fall
somewhere between cracks of government and commu-
nity accountability. Nevertheless, institutional bricolage is
a dynamic process, which allows for a continued renego-
tiation of relations. Allowing such a process to take place
provides a possibility for formal, legal systems to continue
to influence and inform these institutions, and communi-
ties, including the marginalized, as well as to influence
how the government understands their plight. Pakistan
has taken notice of these developments at the national
level, and the experiences of KP are being considered in
other provinces as well. It is important, however, that it
is the process of institutional bricolage that is the lesson,
rather than reproducing institutions that have evolved
specifically in Swat and KP.
The findings likely have relevance for post-conflict police
reform processes in other contexts as well. Single purpose
institutions imposed from outside/above are seldom able
to address the complexity of human security that locally
evolved institutions have the potential to do. They may
be able to address certain issues, but they will not ensure
human security, trusting government/police relations with
communities, nor will they be sustainable. The case of
Swat and KP shows that reforms in police can indeed be
both creative and effective in terms of building more rele-
vant government institutions that are built upon indigenous
principles of negotiation and dialog, while simultaneously
promoting peace and addressing human security in inclu-
sive partnership with communities. More attention to the
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study of these fuzzy areas in between the government and
indigenous systems in other areas could uncover more ex-
amples of how bricolage might result in more accountable
and appropriate security institutions.
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